Diagonality, Revolutionary or Oversold?

For quite some time, diagonality has become popular jargon in football analysis discussion.

The idea for in-possession teams to attack not vertically or horizontally, but diagonally has been proposed as one of the solutions to make offensive patterns more dangerous and less-predictable in the era of better-defensive football.

Well, the idea makes sense. As Judah Davis from the OG Spielverlagerung wrote, “Vertical play aims directly toward goal but can be predictable and limit the passer’s field of view; horizontal circulation stretches the opponent but may lack forward penetration. A diagonal approach strikes a balance. It gains ground toward goal and shifts the point of attack laterally, forcing the opponent to constantly adjust in two dimensions. This multi-axis stress is at the core of diagonality’s effectiveness.”

When we talk about diagonality in form of passing, the diagonal pass from outside (flank) to inside (half-space or center) in the final third is more dangerous than vertical or horizontal passes. A professional analyst from Europe's top four leagues noted this too.

As Jamie Hamilton also wrote, “The diagonal pass from the outside is not just a clever tactic. It is the tactical embodiment of the Body without Organs in football. It creates a smooth space within the game‘s striated coordinates, a space where multiplicity thrives, where the striker becomes a locus of infinite relational possibilities,”.

He added, “It is a creative act that opens football’s phase space to its own uncountable infinities. It refuses to be captured by striated enumerations, by the analyst’s charts, by the coach’s playbook. Instead, it traverses the field diagonally, producing new configurations, new relational basins, new tactical worlds.”

Sounds promising, revolutionary? Indeed. And I am a believer, too.

We‘ve also seen that on the pitch, a lot of teams try to apply this diagonal idea in their offensive mechanism. Bayer Leverkusen under Kasper Hjulmand, Bayern Munich under Vincent Kompany, or Barcelona under Hansi Flick are some of them. Outside the top leagues, Middlesbrough under Kim Hellberg are an honorable mention too. This is real. Top coaches and analysts believe in this idea.

However, for me, I‘ve just watched one game that changed my perspective about diagonality. No, this is not about the idea or concept as a whole—which I still believe—but about the effect or noise of it.

This game made me rethink the diagonality concept and made me think: Maybe it is not as revolutionary as it promised. I will explain to you why.

The game that I refer to is St. Pauli vs Eintracht Frankfurt.

For context, Frankfurt just hired a new coach in Albert Riera (just five games, including vs St. Pauli, under him) and they‘ve been trying to apply the diagonal mechanism in their offense scheme. We can easily notice this from their structure.

Against St. Pauli, Riera formed a 3-1-6 structure in-possession. At the press conference after, he noted that he played with three numbers 10 in left full-back Nathaniel Brown, Fares Chaibi, and Oscar Hojlund. “We need to find the free man inside,“ he said.

When they are in possession, it is also easy to recognise that Frankfurt want to have access diagonally to the half-space. CBs are often trying to find either Brown, Chaibi, or Hojlund directly in the half-space and, interestingly, even when the ball moves to the wing where Arnaud Kalimuendo-Muinga or Jean-Matteo Bahoya positioned themself, these two wingers often adopt body language where they are facing center (horizontally) or half-space (diagonally) when receiving the ball.

The body language, or even the mind of Frankfurt’s players, seems already to think diagonally. Even with the fact that Riera has just been in Frankfurt for a few weeks, the “automatism” is there. The mindset is there, the route is there and on paper, if it works, it could be really dangerous.

However, this diagonality idea of Frankfurt was effectively neutralised by St. Pauli. This success of St. Pauli is the reason why I started to think that this idea is not as revolutionary as it promised, since it requires expensive aspects and uncontrolled things to make it work.

Let me explain how St. Pauli neutralises that diagonal idea of Frankfurt.

First, St. Pauli formed a structure of 5-3-2 or 5-4-1 out-of-possession with a combination of mid and low-block. Form-wise, this is what they usually do under Alexander Blessin.

What makes it special is their pressing approach. First, whenever Frankfurt wide CBs positioned their body vertically, facing the half-space, St. Pauli attackers jumped to them to close the path to prevent them from sending inside passes.

From the Frankfurt side, this situation was usually followed by two things: CBs' bodies started to face the flank and their wide-tens started to move outside, closer to the flank.

St. Pauli also reacted well in this situation: When Frankfurt wide-tens started to move outside, St. Pauli‘s wide CBs jumped to follow them while their wing-backs stayed with Frankfurt‘s wingers.

And this press or jump is crucial. First, because they are not only putting pressure on the players, but they are also closing diagonal paths/inside lines since Frankfurt wide-tens tended to play diagonal passes inside when they were receiving the ball outside.

By pressing from inside, St. Pauli defenders gave Frankfurt attackers no chance to turn to face the attacking goal, since most of the time when they were receiving the ball, they faced their own goal or faced horizontally.

Well, technically, St. Pauli also pressed Frankfurt with a diagonal mindset as the player who presses is not really standing vertically behind the player who he wants to press.

“Even with the players on their level, it is really hard to send one touch pass (diagonally) under pressure like that,“ one professional analyst from a team in Europe‘s top leagues told me.

The way St. Pauli presses inside through their CBs have a better result compared to, if, they are using their wing-backs. With pressure from the outside to the inside via the wing-backs, the Frankfurt wide-tens will have the time and space to turn or send diagonal passes to the centre or the half-space.

There was a moment when Brown successfully sent a diagonal ball when Arkadiusz Pyrka (St. Pauli's right wing-back) and not the usual match-up, Tomoya Ando (St. Pauli's right centre-back), pressed him.

This pressing system works perfectly also because in a diagonal scheme, coaches often use inverted players. For example, Frankfurt‘s right-ten is Nathaniel Brown who is a left footer and their right winger Kalimuendo-Muinga is also a left footer, while Hojlund and Bahoya on the right side are right footers.

With this inverted situation, it is difficult for them to send one pass diagonally to the center or half-space since they are under pressure to play one-touch passes inside, and because the path to turn inside directly is also closed by the opponent. This situation forced them, with their natural foot, to either send the ball to the side or back to the centre back.

The path or space for Frankfurt to access the half-space was also harder to access because St. Pauli double-pivots were aware of either closing the space, pressing Frankfurt tens and six, or helping their teammates with overloads.

With this constant unit pressure (attackers jumping to CBs followed by CBs jumping to attackers, as well as the double-pivot who were aware to close the half-spaces), St. Pauli successfully limited Frankfurt‘s attack. There wasn’t enough route, enough path, or enough space for Frankfurt to make their diagonal scheme work.

Frankfurt only had eight shots in total with zero big chances and a total xG of only 0.34. That was the first time Frankfurt failed to score a goal in five games under Riera.

After the game, St. Pauli centre back Eric Smith also answered my question about their aggressive pressing systems and said it “successfully forced Frankfurt away from our goal.”

Alexander Blessin also stated that he had instructed his wide CBs to jump on the Frankfurt players in order to make it easier for St. Pauli to close the center/inside, since Frankfurt tended to find a person or space there.

Well, yes, there might be an argument to say it is too early to judge Frankfurt's diagonal play since they have basically only played and trained for a few weeks under Riera. They could be better, as Riera stated in the press conference that they need to “have more one-touch passes inside,” especially from CBs.

However, it is also fair to note that Frankfurt have a better squad in terms of quality compared to St. Pauli, especially with the fact that they are a Champions League calibre team. Also with the fact that previously they successfully beat Freiburg and Gladbach, which position-based are also above St. Pauli.

Therefore, I think what St. Pauli did in the game against Frankfurt is a signal: The development or promises of diagonal play might not be as fast as the development of out-of-possession schemes to prevent the play.

What I mean is, to defend diagonal play—to play against it—is much more accessible than to maximise it as an offensive tool.

Because, in my opinion, to make the diagonal scheme run perfectly, a team not only needs to develop or train it more and more, but they also need elite-level players in order to make it run greatly–of course in the context of elite leagues (see Barcelona in La Liga or Simone Inzaghi’s Inter Milan in Serie A).

For context, to play diagonally from outside to inside with one-touch-passes under pressure, it needs a combination of elite players to make it work; thus it requires a lot of money–which is not accessible for some clubs.

Well, good training might also help for teams who don’t have that luxury, but is it good enough to beat a well-trained-defensive team? I‘m not really sure.

Secondly, you need to play against a bad defensive scheme or bad pressing in order to make this work. Well, this, in my opinion, is why some upper-middle or even lesser clubs are sometimes still able to make diagonal schemes work well in their attacking system.

Look at the highlights of diagonal play that some analysts or tactical theorists share; most of the time those highlights require the two aspects I mentioned above.

And what St. Pauli did last weekend against Frankfurt made me realise that this scheme might not be as promising, or as revolutionary as it was written, as it promised. Because, again, a team can easily find a formula to make the second aspect of how-to-make-diagonal-play-work-perfectly disappear.

Well, I still believe in the basic concept, the basic understanding–that diagonality could bring more options/opportunities. But to think of it as a revolutionary way that teams should use offensively, it might not be there (anymore). Because if we see more and more St. Pauli(s), this idea might not be as favourable to some teams anymore. This idea might not be as “vital” anymore.

This might not be the “cure” for the stagnancy of offensive play compared to the advancement of the defensive aspect. Or, this alone couldn’t be the cure for it; this alone shouldn't be the idea that is louder than others.

This also should be taken into account by many analysts: That we might see something as revolutionary because big or dominant teams tend to do it. However, I think some ideas would be hard to be the turning point if they are not “diverse” enough–as in, not applicable to many teams.

Maybe this is also the reason behind the current state of football tactics. I think the “stagnancy” of offensive play that many talk about is not because of a lack of ideas or lack of options, but because being a better defensive team—playing better defensively—is more ACCESSIBLE for many teams. It is more diverse.

Playing offensively with a diagonal scheme is way harder and more expensive than building a defensive structure or pressing scheme to play against it. And it applies to many tactical theories or ideas in this football world.

Personally, I am still curious and interested to see how this situation progresses, and also for this diagonal concept, to see how it is developed—especially to see when this idea become more accessible to the middle-bottom clubs.