Second Ball Game

Alexander Blessin has finally hit upon some new ideas.

After nine defeats in a row, he naturally needed to find a solution to stop the rot and help St. Pauli start picking up points again.

The results, whilst modest, are tangible: they haven't lost in their last three games, taking five points from that run.

Blessin has indeed changed his approach, opting for a more passive style when St. Pauli is out of possession. They have returned to the foundation that helped them stay in the Bundesliga last season: the 5-4-1 shape and the low block are back.

They combine this defensive stability with a pressing trap, mostly on the flanks, creating overloads to force opponents to play backwards or to steal the ball if the opportunity arises. 

In terms of results, it has worked, as they have conceded only two goals. However, the underlying numbers suggest they should have conceded 5.46; thanks to Nikola Vasilj and some poor finishing from opponents, that didn't happen.

Defensively, there are still concerning elements. However, that won’t be the topic today. This article will focus on the adjustments Blessin has made for St. Pauli’s in-possession phase—what happens when they have the ball.

I previously wrote that the lack of dribblers in the St. Pauli squad is worrying. They don't have many alternatives to crack a low block or a compact defensive line without players capable of creating something through individual skill.

This is especially true since the one player naturally able to do that, Oladapo Afolayan, hasn't been in the matchday squad for the last few games, and his potential departure looks increasingly likely.

Given this situation, Blessin has found a solution to help St. Pauli find another way to create chances and score goals: The Second Ball.

First of all, the return of Jackson Irvine has been incredibly influential for this new strategy.

Irvine’s ability to read the game, his intent to make runs into the box, and his defensive grit have brought something to St. Pauli that was missing during his absence—qualities that are vital for this new approach.

St. Pauli is also fortunate to have Joel Fujita and James Sands, both of whom excel at reading the game defensively. These three players fit this new idea perfectly, and it’s likely that the approach was designed with them as the centrepiece.

With Irvine, Sands, and Fujita playing together, St. Pauli lines up in a 5-3-2 formation on paper. But when they have the ball, this shifts to a 3-1-6 or 3-2-5, depending on Irvine’s positioning.

If Irvine feels the team needs help in the build-up phase, he drops deep to provide another passing option. But if the opponent decides to drop off, Irvine positions himself high, usually in the left half-space.

Even when St. Pauli’s defenders have control of the ball and aren't being pressed high, James Sands can also push up front to act as another target.

Alternatively, if the opponent decides to press high, Nikola Vasilj or the defenders can play the long ball directly upfield. This is the key.

With this new formation, St. Pauli has enough bodies up top to win the second ball. Unlike the previous 3-4-1-2 formation, the midfielders now position themselves high rather than dropping deep to aid the build-up.

In the previous system, the front line often lacked physical presence because Danel Sinani operated as a false nine who loved to drop deep to receive the ball. Consequently, St. Pauli lacked a target up front.

We can see the difference in these two pictures, for example:

St. Pauli is now more advanced in their positioning if they decide to play directly up front. In these situations, they have enough bodies to overload the areas where the second ball is likely to drop.

With this ability to win the second ball—or win possession from a direct ball due to these overloads—St. Pauli is able to create opportunities to attack.

This type of situation is exactly where their goals have come from recently, including in the DFB Pokal game against Borussia Mönchengladbach.

Look at the sequence when St. Pauli scored the winner against Gladbach. It started with a direct ball where St. Pauli matched Gladbach in a 4v4 situation. James Sands won the header, and the ball eventually arrived at Martijn Kaars' feet.

Kaars then moved to the left side where Louis Oppie was already in a 1v1 situation, free to make a move and shoot against his isolated opponent.

Interestingly, St. Pauli's first goal also came from winning a loose/second ball due to their ability to overload one side.

Their ability to trap opponents on one side by creating an overload also rewarded them with a goal against Bayern Munich. While this might be more related to out-of-possession work, the foundation is the same.

St. Pauli tries to gain an advantage by committing more bodies to a specific area, using that as a platform to launch quick attacks.

Against Heidenheim, the strategy of maximising the second ball became even more obvious. St. Pauli often sent the ball directly to Mathias Pereira Lage up top, with four or five players sprinting towards him as a unit to contest the loose ball.

Because that unit usually overloads the opponent, it makes it easier for them to win the ball and release an attack from an advantageous position—specifically, where the opponent‘s defensive line is disorganised from fighting for the long ball.

This scenario is exactly how St. Pauli's first goal came about: they won the second ball, fed it to Arkadiusz Pyrka, and surrounded the Heidenheim box with numbers.

That sequence ended with Fujita finding Kaars perfectly in the box after the Dutch forward made a smart run from outside the area. Inside, Heidenheim‘s defenders were locked down by the presence of Fujita, Pereira Lage, Irvine, and Oppie. Again, the numbers helped St. Pauli.

It is also not surprising that in the last three Bundesliga games, St. Pauli has consistently won the "second-ball battle"—always recording more second-ball recoveries than their opponents. Crucially, this usually happens in the opponent‘s half.

Against Köln, Irvine was the star in this regard, whilst against Heidenheim, it was Sands.

However, against Mainz, the situation was different. St. Pauli still won the second-ball battle, but they struggled to win it in the middle or convert possession into chances. This was due to Mainz's deep structure; they often had 10 outfield players in their own half, maintaining a compact and deep defensive line.

What Mainz did is a signal of how to neutralise this new St. Pauli idea. However, ideally, this shouldn't be a massive concern, as most teams playing against St. Pauli will try to take more control of possession.

Even teams like Heidenheim and Köln took proactive approaches against St. Pauli, so the likelihood of facing a team that defends as deep as Mainz is relatively low.

The problem, though, is that St. Pauli still needs to find an alternative way to attack on their own initiative. If "Plan A" doesn't work, they need a solution. Plan A relies heavily on how the opponent approaches them.

This explains why St. Pauli is still struggling in the Expected Goals (xG) department; their chances are mostly related to the game state, taking advantage of chaos they don't fully control.

St. Pauli needs a strategy they can control themselves—a proactive approach where they create with the ball at their feet.

Having a player who can create something individually, like through dribbling, would help. However, Blessin hasn't really involved Afolayan in his system lately (assuming this exclusion is purely sporting).

This might change if St. Pauli succeeds in bringing Morgan Guilavogui back to the squad, as he is a forward who can create with the ball. Alternatively, they need other players with that same ability who are also willing to work hard off the ball.

It is worth remembering that St. Pauli ranks bottom of the Bundesliga for carries into the penalty box—an action that is vital for creating chances.

In my opinion, another thing Blessin and his staff should consider to increase chance creation is maximising diagonal passes.

St. Pauli has been using their wing-backs high up the pitch, sometimes as targets for through-balls (Oppie has scored and gained advantages from this). However, if the result isn't a shot, the wing-backs aren't particularly dangerous in terms of creating chances via passing.

Yes, Oppie has scored, but he averages only 1.13 shot-creating actions via live passes per 90 minutes. That is very low for someone who touches the ball 18.9 times on average in the middle third.

For context, Arkadiusz Pyrka averages 1.24 shot-creating actions via live passes, despite touching the ball 17.5 times in the final third per 90 minutes.

Therefore, why not use them as early progressors rather than creators? Instead of using them close to the penalty area, I think it is worth trying to use them to send diagonal passes more often.

I know Blessin has used this tactic before, but his system didn't have as much physical presence up front as their recent performances have shown.

With enough bodies in the half-spaces and central areas, St. Pauli could maximise the movement of Fujita and Irvine to combine with forwards like Pereira Lage and Kaars, rather than relying on the wing-backs to create.

Attacking the half-spaces and the centre directly could also help them create shots from better positions, rather than relying on sporadic wing play (St. Pauli is fifth in total crosses across the Bundesliga, but bottom two in terms of accurate crosses into the penalty area).

However, if the wing-backs are viewed as the primary threat, I assume St. Pauli is actively looking for new wing-backs—especially for the left side—during this winter window.

Nothing against Oppie or Pyrka, but if St. Pauli had wing-backs capable of delivering better crosses or creating something individually via take-ons, their attack would be far more dangerous than it is now.

***

Blessin has found solutions for St. Pauli created chances and scored goals, and it has helped them avoid defeat in their last four games across all competitions.

Their ability to win the second-ball battle and turn it into chances is definitely worth sticking with, as is their use of overload traps to win the ball or connect attacks.

These tactics help, yes. But they also need to find another solution, because winning is often about who has the most variations in their game. St. Pauli lacks that variation this season.

Whether it is finding another way to attack that remains under their control, or bringing in additional players, they desperately need that evolution to stay in the Bundesliga this season.